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Abstract. We revisit the problem of Full Disk Encryption (FDE), which
refers to the encryption of each sector of a disk volume. In the context
of FDE, it is assumed that there is no space to store additional data,
such as an IV (Initialization Vector) or a MAC (Message Authentica-
tion Code) value. We formally define the security notions in this model
against chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attacks. Then, we clas-
sify various FDE modes of operation according to their security in this
setting, in the presence of various restrictions on the queries of the ad-
versary. We will find that our approach leads to new insights for both
theory and practice. Moreover, we introduce the notion of a diversifier,
which does not require additional storage, but allows the plaintext of a
particular sector to be encrypted to different ciphertexts. We show how a
2-bit diversifier can be implemented in the EagleTree simulator for solid
state drives (SSDs), while decreasing the total number of Input/Output
Operations Per Second (IOPS) by only 4%.
Keywords: Disk encryption theory, full disk encryption, FDE, XTS,
IEEE P1619, unique first block, diversifier, provable security.
1 Introduction
The term Full Disk Encryption (FDE) is commonly used when every sector of a
disk volume is encrypted. There is typically no space to store any additional data,
such as an IV or a MAC. As explained by Ferguson [11], generic solutions to store
additional data will at least double the number of read and write operations,
and will significantly reduce the available disk space. They also change the disk
layout, which makes it extremely complicated to enable FDE on existing disks.
With this restriction, FDE cannot offer authentication, or at best “poor-
man’s authentication” [11], which is to hope that ciphertext changes will result in
a plaintext that is random enough to make the application crash. It can also not
achieve chosen-plaintext indistinguishability: when the same data is encrypted
twice at the same sector index, the resulting ciphertexts will be identical.
Additional efficiency constraints may be imposed on FDE as well. For ex-
ample, it can be desirable to perform encryption and/or decryption in parallel,
which is not possible for inherently sequential constructions where the i-th plain-
text block of a sector cannot be processed until all previous plaintext blocks are
processed. If there is not enough memory available to store an entire sector, it
may be required that encryption and decryption are on-line, meaning that the
i-th block of a sector may only depend on the preceding blocks.
These implementation constraints impose severe restrictions on the algo-
rithms that can be used for FDE. A general problem in the domain of FDE,
however, is that the security properties of the resulting constructions are not al-
ways well-understood. On the other hand, cryptographers often complain about
the absence of well-defined cryptographic goals for FDE (see e.g. Rogaway [25]),
which are prerequisites to find a good-trade-off between security and efficiency.
Our Contributions. Firstly, we want to measure “how much security is left”
within the constraints of FDE. In order to do so, we introduce a theoretical
framework to capture that a FDE algorithm behaves as “randomly as possible”
subject to different practical constraints. We consider settings where the encryp-
tion oracle can be random-up-to-repetition, random-up-to-prefix or random-up-
to-block.
For each of the attack settings in the framework, we list an efficient con-
struction that achieves security within this setting. We recall existing security
results, and provide new proofs, in particular in the unique-first-block (ufb) set-
ting where the Operating System (OS) or application ensures that the first n
bits of the plaintext will not be repeated for a particular sector number, where
n is the block size of the underlying block cipher.
Our model recalls that the modes of operation CBC (Cipher Block Chaining)
and IGE (Infinite Garble Extension), even with a secret IV, do not achieve the
security properties that developers often wrongly assume for these constructions.
As already shown by Bellare et al. [2], CBC and IGE are not IND-CPA secure up-
to-prefix. We will prove, however, that both constructions are IND-CPA secure
under the ufb constraint.
Regarding chosen-ciphertext attacks, we point out that Added Redundancy
Explicit Authentication (AREA) [12] is not secure when used with CBC or IGE,
even when the IV is secret. The insecurity of constructions such as AREA was
already shown in 2001 by Jutla [21], but has nevertheless not yet been pointed
out in the context of FDE. We recall that there exist constructions that are
secure in this setting, such as TC2 and TC3 [26].
Secondly, we revisit the FDE constraints from an engineering point of view.
We show that it is possible to produce different ciphertexts for the same plain-
text at a particular sector index, without storing additional data. Our solution
applies to solid state drives (SSDs), where we show how the SSD firmware can
be modified to associate a diversifier to every sector. This is done without mod-
ifying the data structures of the SSD, but by forcing data to be written to a
particular Logical Unit Number (LUN).
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For any particular sector, the diversifier value must be unique. But as we
will explain later, additional requirements are necessary for performance reasons.
When looking at all sectors at any particular point in time, each diversifier value
should occur roughly the same number of times. Additionally, this diversifier
value can typically only be a few bits long. These requirements put the diversifier
in a class by itself, and not as a specific case of a random IV or a nonce (i.e. a
number that is only used once).
When we benchmarked our solution in a modified EagleTree simulator [9], we
found that it increases the average latency by at most 12% for reads and 2% for
writes, and that it reduces the SSD throughput (read and write combined) by less
than 4%. This paper provides the first efficient FDE solution that can achieve
indistinguishability against chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attacks.
Related Work. The problem of FDE has been researched extensively, see for
example Rogaway [25] for a provable security treatment, or Fruhwirth [12] for
an implementer’s perspective. The formal requirements of disk encryption are
often not clearly stated.
FDE is a topic that has gathered significant interest from industry and stan-
dardization, and often leads to application-specific solutions due to the special
requirements of full disk encryption. Of particular interest are the elephant dif-
fuser used in Microsoft’s BitLocker [11], or IEEE P1619’s XTS standard [18],
which later became a NIST recommendation [10] as well.
Throughout this paper, we assume that adversary has access to the disk
volume at any time. The adversary has (partial) knowledge and even control of
the plaintext, and can even change the ciphertext as well. We therefore go beyond
just “single point-in-time permanent offline compromise” (see e.g. [13,15]). Read
and write operations are assumed to be atomic (on a sector level), so we do not
consider blockwise adaptive attacks [19].
Sound key management is required to avoid that the plaintext contains the
key, or any function of the key [16]. Physical access threats (e.g. cold boot, DMA,
evil maid, or hot plug attacks [14, 22]) are also outside the scope of this paper.
2 Disk Encryption Methods
Data is read and written in a sector-addressable device by fixed-length units
called sectors, usually 512 or 4096 bytes long. The OS can access a specific
sector by its sector number s. We consider the case of an encrypted disk volume
where data is encrypted by the OS before being stored.
We list the modes of operation that frequently appear in the context of FDE,
whether it be in academic literature or in practical implementations. We also
mention other modes with interesting security or efficiency properties.
ECB (Electronic Codebook). In the simplest encryption mode, the plain-
text is divided into blocks of n bits, and each block is encrypted separately using
an n-bit block cipher. It can readily be used for FDE, even though it is well-
known that it does not provide adequate security.
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. . .c0 c1 c3 cℓ
EK′ EK EK
CBC-essiv
s m1 m2 m3 mℓ. . .
. . .c0 c1 c2 c3 cℓ
EK′ EK EK EK
IGE-essiv
Fig. 1. Description of the CBC-essiv and IGE-essiv modes of operation.
CTR (Counter). This mode uses a counter (incremented for each block)
that is encrypted and then XORed with the plaintext block to output the ci-
phertext block. Typically, the counter is the sector number, bit-shifted to the left
over a sufficient number of bits so that the least-significant bits can represent a
counter for the number of blocks in one sector. CTR mode is IND-CPA secure [4]
under the assumption that the counter is a nonce. In the context of FDE, this
assumption does not hold as sectors can be overwritten.
CBC. In this mode, each plaintext block is XORed with the previous ci-
phertext block (or an IV for the first plaintext block) before being encrypted.
To achieve the IND-CPA security notion, it is well-known that the IV has to be
a random value [4]. However, for FDE, a first natural idea is to use the sector
number as an IV. Fruhwirth [12] proposed to use as an IV the encryption of the
sector number by the block cipher keyed with an independent key (see Fig. 1).6
IGE. IGE was proposed Campbell [8] as a variant of CBC mode where each
block of plaintext is XORed with the next ciphertext block (see Fig. 1). For
FDE, since the sector number is not secret, we will consider the variant where
the IV is the encryption of the sector number s in which s is not XORed to the
first ciphertext block. We will refer to this mode as IGE-essiv.
XTS. XTS [18] applies a tweakable block cipher to every n-bit block of a
sector, where the tweak depends on the sector number and on the index of the
block within the sector. It uses ciphertext stealing when the sector size is not a
multiple of n bits, however such sectors sizes are not considered in this paper.
TC1, TC2 and TC3. These modes for tweakable block ciphers were defined
by Rogaway and Zhang in [26]. The difference between these constructions is the
way the tweak is used:
– In TC1, the tweak is the previous ciphertext block as in the HCBC mode [2];
– In TC2, the tweak is the concatenation of the previous ciphertext block and
the previous plaintext block as in the HCBC2 mode [2];
– In TC3 mode, the tweak is the XOR of the previous ciphertext block and
the previous plaintext block as in the MHCBC2 mode [23].
6 Two distinct keys are needed: the message is encrypted with key K, and the IV is
encrypted with keyK′ �= K (see Fig. 1), in order to avoid an attack by Rogaway [24].
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WTBC (Wide Tweakable Block ciphers). In the context of FDE, the
block size of a WTBC is equal to the sector size, and the sector number is used
as the tweak input. From a security point of view, any change in the plain-
text or ciphertext affects the entire sector. A WTBC is typically realized using
smaller (tweakable) block ciphers, as for example in the EME (Encrypt-Mix-
Encrypt) [17] mode.
Our goal in this paper is to analyze these constructions and to evaluate their
security in different models.
3 Security Notions for FDE
In this section, we formalize several security notions for FDE. We first give a
formal syntactic definition of block-cipher-based FDE.
It is assumed that the plaintext of a sector is a multiple of n which is the
block cipher size. All plaintexts are ℓ blocks of n bits. mi denotes the i-th block
of the plaintext m such that m = m1||m2||...||mℓ where || denotes concatenation
of strings. IND-CPA-xx corresponds to IND-CPA up-to-block, IND-CPA up-to-
prefix, IND-CPA up-to-repetition and IND-CPA.
Definition 1. Let k, n and ℓ be three positive integers. A (k, n, ℓ)-block-cipher-
based FDE scheme is a pair of algorithms (Enc,Dec) such that:
– Enc is the (deterministic) encryption algorithm which takes as input a key
K ∈ {0, 1}k, a sector number s ∈ {0, 1}n and a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}ℓ·n and
outputs a ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1}ℓ·n;
– Dec is the (deterministic) decryption algorithm which takes as input a key
K ∈ {0, 1}k, a sector number s ∈ {0, 1}n and a ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1}ℓ·n and
outputs a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}ℓ·n,
such that ∀(K, s,m) ∈ {0, 1}k+n+ℓ·n : Dec(K, s,Enc(K, s,m)) = m.
For each security notion, we define two variants: security under Chosen-
Plaintext Attack (CPA) where the adversary is given access to the Encrypt
procedure and security under Chosen-Ciphertext Attack (CCA) where the ad-
versary is also given access to the Decrypt procedure. The adversary is not
allowed to query the decryption of a ciphertext that was previously returned by
Encrypt or vice versa.
Indistinguishability up-to-block. Each ciphertext block depends determin-
istically on the plaintext block, the sector number s and the block position in
the plaintext, but behaves as “randomly as possible” subject to this constraint.
The corresponding game described in Appendix B uses independent random
permutations Π(s,i) : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n for each sector number s and each block
position i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}. We specifically introduce this setting to describe the
security goal of XTS, see Rogaway [25] for a formal definition (using a filter
function) of what is known to leak by the XTS mode.
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Indistinguishability up-to-prefix. For i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, the i-th ciphertext
block depends deterministically on the sector number s and all previous plain-
text blocks at position j for j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, but again behave as “randomly as
possible” subject to this constraint. The corresponding game described in Ap-
pendix B uses independent random permutations Πim : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}n for
each sector number s and each plaintext prefix m ∈ {0, 1}t·n for t ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}.
This notion corresponds to security notion described in [2] for on-line ciphers.
Indistinguishability up-to-repetition. Each ciphertext block depends deter-
ministically on the plaintext block and the sector number s, but behaves as “ran-
domly as possible” subject to this constraint. The corresponding game described
in Appendix B uses independent random permutations Πs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
for each sector number s. It is the best achievable notion for (length-preserving)
deterministic encryption [3].
Remark 1. If a construction is IND-CCA under one of these notions, it is also
IND-CPA under the corresponding security notion.
Remark 2. If a construction is not IND-CPA under one of these notions, it is
also not IND-CCA under the corresponding security notion.
As different ideal-world encryption oracles are used in the various security
notions, it is trivially possible to distinguish between the encryption oracles.
For example, for a fixed sector number and position on the plaintext, an IND-
CPA up-to-block construction always returns the same ciphertext block. This
construction does not reach IND-CPA up-to-prefix security, which requires in-
distinguishablilty up to the longest common prefix for a fixed sector number.
It also does not satisfy IND-CPA up-to-repetition security, which requires in-
distinguishability up to repetition of the plaintext for a given sector number.
Conversely, a construction that achieves IND-CPA up-to-prefix security will also
not be IND-CPA up-to-block nor IND-CPA up-to-repetition using a similar rea-
soning.
Analysis of Existing Constructions. We now analyze the FDE modes of
operation described in Sect. 2 with respect to these security notions. These
results are summarized in Table 1. The properties shown in the three last lines
of Table 1 are relevant implementation properties, but are not taken into account
in the security proofs.
ECB mode. Unsurprisingly, ECB is not IND-CPA for any of our three
security notions.
CTR mode. CTR is not IND-CPA for any of our three security notions.
An adversary can simply query the encryption of m1 = 0
n||m2||..||mℓ and m2 =
1n||m2||..||mℓ for the same sector number s (where m2, ...,mℓ can be any n-bit
blocks). The first blocks of the obtained ciphertexts c1 and c2 will always satisfy
c11 = c
1
2 ⊕ 1
n, whereas this property holds only with probability 2−n in all three
random worlds.
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Table 1. The security of FDE modes of operation when no diversifier is used. Here,
✓ means that there is a security proof, and ✗ means that there is an attack. Proofs of
the security results can be found in Sect. 3. XTS: see [18]. TC1, TC2 and TC3 [26] are
generalizations of the HCBC1 [2], HCBC2 [2] and MHCBC [23] constructions. WTBC:
wide tweakable block cipher. The ⋆ symbol indicates that the property holds for some
constructions, but not for others. Here, x ≥ log2(ℓ).
ECB CTR CBC CBC IGE XTS TC1 TC2/3 WTBC
IV → n/a s ≪ x s EK′(s) EK′(s) s s s s
IND-CPA-block ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
IND-CPA-prefix ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗
IND-CPA-repetition ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
IND-CPA ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
IND-CCA-block ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
IND-CCA-prefix ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
IND-CCA-repetition ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
IND-CCA ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
on-line enc./dec. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
parallelizable enc. ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓⋆
parallelizable dec. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓⋆
CBC mode. The attack on the CTR mode also applies to the variant of
the CBC mode where the sector number is used as an IV. In the context of
FDE, this attack is known as a Saarinen’s watermarking attack [27]. Bellare et
al. [2] describe an attack on the CBC-based online cipher that shows that CBC-
essiv is not IND-CPA up-to-prefix. This attack can be adapted to construct an
adversary A for our three security notions:
1. A arbitrarily chooses (ℓ−1) blocksm2, ..,mℓ and a sector number s. A builds
two plaintexts m1 = 0
n||m2|| . . . ||mℓ and m2 = 1
n||m2|| . . . ||mℓ that differ
only in their first block.
2. A queries the Encrypt procedure to obtain the encryption of m1 and m2
on sector number s: c1b ||c
2
b || . . . ||c
ℓ
b ← Encrypt(s,mb) for b ∈ {1, 2}.
3. A builds m3 = 1
n||m23||m
3|| . . . ||mℓ where m23 = m
2⊕c11⊕c
1
2 and queries the
Encrypt procedure to obtain its encryption: c13||...||c
ℓ
3 ← Encrypt(s,m3)
4. A returns 0 to the Finalize procedure if c23 = c
2
1 and 1 otherwise.
The equality c23 = c
2
1 is always satisfied in the real world but holds only with
probability 2−n in all three random worlds.
IGE-essiv mode. The previous attack on the CBC-essiv mode can easily
be adapted to show that IGE-essiv is not IND-CPA for any of our three security
notions. The attack is identical except that the adversary A checks whether the
equality c23 = c
2
1 ⊕ 1
n holds or not.
XTS mode. As explained above, in XTS every plaintext block is encrypted
separately using a tweakable block cipher, where the tweak is derived from the
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sector number and index of the block within the sector. As argued by Rog-
away [25], XTS is IND-CPA up-to-block secure. For syntactic reasons, it is not
IND-CPA up-to-prefix nor IND-CPA up-to-repetition.
TC1, TC2, TC3 modes. Rogaway and Zhang [26] showed that TC1 is
IND-CPA up-to-prefix secure but not IND-CCA up-to-prefix. They also proved
that TC2 and TC3 are IND-CCA up-to-prefix (and thus also IND-CPA up-to-
prefix) secure. For syntactic reasons, they are not IND-CPA up-to-block nor
IND-CPA up-to-repetition.
WTBC modes. Halevi and Rogaway showed that EME is IND-CCA up-
to-repetition (and thus IND-CPA up-to-repetition) secure in [17]. For syntactic
reasons, these modes are not IND-CPA up-to-block nor IND-CPA up-to-prefix.
4 FDE Security with Unique First Block
Because encryption in the context of FDE is deterministic and length-preserving,
encrypting the same plaintext twice will always result in an identical ciphertext.
The OS or application may therefore want to use a particular encoding of the
plaintext, in order to ensure that the ciphertext will not be repeated. This corre-
sponds to Bellare and Rogaway’s Encode-Then-Encipher approach [5] to ensure
strong privacy. One thus has to determine which encoding is sufficient to ensure
security against CPA. In the context of security “up-to-block,” this would re-
quire a large overhead, since encoding is then required for every block of a sector
(typically 128 bits). However, for schemes that are IND-CPA “up-to-repetition”
or “up-to-prefix,” it is sufficient to ensure that the beginning of every message
is unique. This can be done by prepending either random data or a counter, as
suggested by Bellare and Rogaway [5].
In this section, we consider variants of the previous security notions with
unique first block (ufb) and we prove that IND-CPA security for CBC-essiv and
IGE-essiv under this assumption. An application that is aware of this restriction,
can therefore format its input such that the first block of every sector is unique.
Appendix A gives a concrete example of such an application.
Relation to Previous Security Notions. The only difference between ufb
model and the previous model is that for a given sector number s, A cannot make
two queries to encrypt plaintexts that have same first block. So if a construction
is secure under a security notion described in Sect. 3, it is still the case in this
model. Furthermore, the IND-CPA up-to-prefix, IND-CPA up-to-repetition and
IND-CPA security notions become equivalent. This is easy to see: if the first block
of plaintext is not repeated, then this is sufficient to ensure that the plaintext
prefix or the entire plaintext is will not be repeated either.
Security Results. In this paragraph, we analyze the FDE modes of operation
described in Sect. 2 with respect to these security notions for unique first block.
These results are summarized in Table 2. For the security proofs of Theorems 1
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Table 2. The security of FDE modes of operation when no diversifier is used, but the
first plaintext block unique for any given sector. Here, ✓ means that there is a security
proof, and ✗ means that there is an attack.
ECB CTR CBC CBC IGE XTS TC1 TC2/3 WTBC
IV → n/a s ≪ x s EK′(s) EK′(s) s s s s
IND-CPA-block ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
IND-CPA-prefix ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
IND-CPA-repetition ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
IND-CPA ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
IND-CCA-block ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
IND-CCA-prefix ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
IND-CCA-repetition ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
IND-CCA ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
on-line enc./dec. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
parallelizable enc. ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓⋆
parallelizable dec. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓⋆
and 2, we used the code-based game playing framework [7]. The proofs can be
found in Appendix D.
ECB and CTR. The attacks described in Sect. 3 do not make queries with
the same first block and the same sector number, and therefore still apply.
CBC-essiv. For this mode, in the attack of Sect. 3, A makes forbidden
queries with the same first block. The following theorem states that CBC-essiv
achieves IND-CPA-ufb security if the underlying block cipher E is a Pseudo-
Random Function (PRF) [6].
Theorem 1 [The IND-CPA-ufb Security of CBC-essiv]
Let E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a block cipher. Let A be an IND-CPA-ufb
adversary against the FDE scheme obtained from the CBC-essiv mode on E such
that A runs in time t and makes at most q queries to the Encrypt procedure.
There exists an adversary B (attacking the PRF security of E) such that:
Advind−cpa−ufbcbc−essiv (A) ≤ 8 ·Adv
prf
E (B) +
q2(ℓ+ 1)2
2n−1
where B runs in time at most t′ = t + O(q + nq(ℓ + 1)) and makes at most
q′ = q(ℓ+ 1) queries to its oracle.
The following attack shows that it does not achieve IND-CCA-ufb up-to-
prefix security:
1. A chooses a plaintext m1 = m
1
1||m
2
1||..||m
ℓ
1 ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ·n and a sector number
s and queries the Encrypt procedure with (s,m1) to obtain c
1
1||c
2
1||..||c
ℓ
1.
2. A builds a ciphertext c2 = c
1
2||c
2
2||..||c
ℓ
2 with c
1
2 = c
2
1, c
2
2 = c
3
1 and arbitrary
ci2 ∈ {0, 1}
n for i ∈ {3, . . . , ℓ} and query the Decrypt procedure with (s, c2)
to obtain a plaintext m2 = m
1
2||m
2
2||..||m
ℓ
2.
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3. A outputs 0 if m22 = m
3
1 and 1 otherwise.
The equality m22 = m
3
1 is always satisfied in the real world but this property
holds only with probability 2−n in the random world.
IGE-essiv. The following theorem states that the mode IGE-essiv achieves
IND-CPA-ufb security:
Theorem 2 [The IND-CPA-ufb Security of IGE-essiv]
Let E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a block cipher. Let A be an IND-CPA-ufb
adversary against the FDE scheme obtained from the IGE-essiv mode on E such
that A runs in time t and makes at most q queries to the Encrypt procedure.
There exists an adversary B (attacking the PRF security of E) such that:
Advind−cpa−ufbige−essiv (A) ≤ 8 ·Adv
prf
E (B) +
q2(ℓ+ 1)2
2n−1
where B runs in time at most t′ = t + O(q + nq(ℓ + 1)) and makes at most
q′ = q(ℓ+ 1) queries to its oracle.
The following attack (inspired by Rohatgi [20]) shows that IGE-essiv does
not achieve IND-CCA-ufb up-to-prefix security:
1. A chooses a plaintext m1 = m
1
1||m
2
1||..||m
ℓ
1 ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ·n and a sector number
s and queries the Encrypt procedure with (s,m1) to obtain c
1
1||c
2
1||..||c
ℓ
1.
2. A builds a ciphertext c2 = c
1
2||c
2
2||..||c
ℓ
2 with c
1
2 = c
1
1, c
2
2 = m
2
1 ⊕ c
3
1 ⊕m
1
1 and
arbitrary ci2 ∈ {0, 1}
n for i ∈ {3, . . . , ℓ} and query the Decrypt procedure
with (s, c2) to obtain a plaintext m2 = m
1
2||m
2
2||..||m
ℓ
2.
3. A outputs 0 if m22 = m
3
1 ⊕ c
2
1 ⊕ c
1
1 and 1 otherwise.
The equality m22 = m
3
1 ⊕ c
2
1 ⊕ c
1
1 is always satisfied in the real world but this
property holds only with probability 2−n in the random world.
The TC1, TC2, TC3 and WTBC constructions become IND-CPA with the
ufb restriction because TC1/2/3 were IND-CPA up-to-prefix and WTBC con-
structions were IND-CPA up-to-repetition as explained in Sect. 3.
5 FDE Security with a Diversifier
Typically, IND-CPA cannot be reached for FDE, as the deterministic nature
of FDE means that identical plaintexts will result in identical ciphertexts. We
worked around this problem in the previous section by imposing a restriction on
the plaintext: the first plaintext block must be unique.
Now, we introduce another way to achieve IND-CPA, without imposing re-
strictions on the plaintext, but still without storing additional data. Instead, we
will use a diversifier j, which will be associated to every sector.
To stay within the constraints of FDE, it should somehow be possible to
assign a diversifier to every sector without using additional storage. Possible
candidates in the particular case of SSDs will be considered in Sect. 6. For now,
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it is enough to consider that for each encryption, a diversifier is picked among
{0, 1}d, in such a way this diversifier is never repeated for a particular sector.
Then two identical plaintexts with the same sector number will have different
ciphertexts, a property that could previously not be achieved within the context
of FDE.
The combination of the sector number s and the diversifier j is used instead
of the sector number in FDE constructions. The combination proposed is simply
the concatenation between these two values s||j such as s ∈ {0, 1}σ, j ∈ {0, 1}d
and n = d+ σ.
For the analysis in this section, it suffices that the diversifier is never repeated
for a particular sector. As such, the security analysis is the same as if the diver-
sifier were a nonce. However, we will explain in Sect. 6 that efficiency reasons
require that at any particular point in time, all diversifier values should occur
roughly the same number of times, and that the diversifier must be a rather
short value, typically only a few bits.
Security Results. IND-CPA up-to-repetition becomes equivalent to IND-CPA
security: the only difference between these notions is that if A asks to encrypt
twice the same query (s,m) the answer will be the same ciphertext but these
queries are not allowed any more under the diversifier model. Moreover in IND-
CCA game, the adversary is not allowed to query the decryption of a ciphertext
what was previously encrypted, or vice versa. It can therefore be seen that
IND-CCA up-to-repetition becomes equivalent to IND-CCA. Similarly, since the
adversaryA is not allowed to encrypt twice with the same pair s||j, the IND-CPA
up-to-block property is also equivalent to the other IND-CPA security notions.
Table 3 summarizes the security properties achieved by the FDE modes of
operation when used with a diversifier. The IND-CPA attacks of Sect. 3 still
carry over to ECB and CBC with a sector-number IV. However CTR mode
becomes secure as the counter value is not repeated [4]. The IND-CPA security
of XTS, TC1, TC2, TC3 and WTBC follows from the fact that the tweak is not
reused. For CBC-essiv and IGE-essiv, the IND-CPA security follows from the
proof of Sect. 4: now the first block may be reused, but the IV is unique.
Let us explain the attacks under IND-CCA in Table 3:
– This following attack shows that CTR is not IND-CCA-xx: A encrypts
(s||j,m) with m any plaintext and any s||j and receives c then A decrypts
(s||j, c′) where c′ = c⊕0n−11. A. Then, m′1 = m1⊕0n−11 is always satisfied
in the real world, but holds only with probability 2−n in the ideal world.
– CBC-essiv and IGE-essiv are not secure: the attacks of Sect. 4 still apply, as
they did not perform two encryptions with the same sector number.
– For syntactical reasons, an encryption scheme can only be IND-CCA up-
to-block, IND-CCA up-to-prefix, or IND-CCA up-to-repetition. XTS is only
IND-CCA up-to-block, TC2 and TC3 are only IND-CCA up-to-prefix and
WBTC are only IND-CCA up-to-repetition.
As shown in Table 3, the diversifier shows how to reach IND-CPA security for
most commonly-used FDE encryption modes. It also succeeds at providing IND-
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CCA security for WTBC constructions, which not achievable in a “classical”
FDE model.
Table 3. The security of FDE modes of operation when a diversifier is used. Here, ✓
means that there is a security proof, and ✗ means that there is an attack.
ECB CTR CBC CBC IGE XTS TC1 TC2/3 WTBC
IV → n/a s�j ≪ x s�j EK′(s�j) EK′(s�j) s�j s�j s�j s�j
IND-CPA-block ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
IND-CPA-prefix ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
IND-CPA-repetition ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
IND-CPA ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
IND-CCA-block ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
IND-CCA-prefix ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
IND-CCA-repetition ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
IND-CCA ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
on-line enc./dec. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
parallelizable enc. ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓⋆
parallelizable dec. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓⋆
6 Solid State Drive
We now explain the basics of SSD storage, so that we can explain how to modify
only the firmware of SSDs to associate a diversifier to every sector. This diversi-
fier allows us to encrypt the same plaintext in distinct ways for the same sector
number.
SSDs are flash memory devices that are gradually replacing the magnetic
Hard Disk Drive (HDD) due to their reliability and performance. Just like HDDs,
they are sector-addressable devices. They are indexed by a sector number that
is also known as a Logical Block Address (LBA). This ensures that the physical
details of the storage device are not exposed to the OS, but are managed by the
firmware of the storage device.
For SSDs, the Flash Translation Layer (FTL) stores the mapping between
LBAs and Physical Block Addresses (PBAs). This FTL is necessary to ensure
an even distribution of writes to every sector number (wear leveling) and to
invalidate blocks so that they can later be recycled (garbage collection). This
FTL is necessary due to the physical constraints of flash storage: any physical
address can only be written a limited number of times, and rewriting individual
sectors is not possible: invalidated sectors can only be recovered in multiples of
the erase block size.
SSD Components. The flash memory of an SSD is hierarchically organized
as a set of flash chips called packages, which are further divided in dies, planes,
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blocks7 and pages. Every page consists of one or more sectors, and is the small-
est unit that can be written. The smallest unit that can be erased in a block.
Invalidated blocks must be erased before writing, and the number of erasures
and writes to every block is limited for flash storage.
To abstract away the notion of packages, dies and planes, the Open NAND
Flash Interface (ONFI) standard introduces the notion of Logical Unit Number
(LUN) as the minimum granularity of parallelism for flash storage. As operations
can be issued to several planes in parallel, a LUN corresponds to a plane.
Introducing a Diversifier. In the context of SSD storage, we will show how to
associate a diversifier to every LBA. This diversifier will not be stored, and will
not modify the data structures of the SSD. Instead, the diversifier will impose
an additional restriction on the FTL, meaning that the diversifier determines
which PBAs can store the data corresponding to a particular LBA.
The intuition is that if the diversifier is selected “randomly” for every write
operation, the data will be spread out evenly over the SSD, and the SSD per-
formance should not be affected too much. We will verify this by implementing
and benchmarking our proposed solution in Sect. 6.
When a write command is issued, there are various ways to specify a diver-
sifier value for a given LBA. We will prefer to transmit this information in one
operation. As such, we do not only avoid the performance drawbacks of issuing
several operations to write one sector, but we also do not need to worry about
inconsistent states when operations are lost, modified, or reordered.
In particular, we propose to send the diversifier along with the sector data as
part of a “fat” sector that is already supported in SATA (Serial ATA) interface
for storage devices. This diversifier value will be returned to the OS when a fat
sector read command is issued.
In an attempt to make the diversifier as long as possible, we may want to con-
sider the optimal (yet completely unrealistic) scenario: the diversifier uniquely
specifies the physical page to which the data must be written. But even then,
the size of the diversfier typically be very short: e.g. only 24 bits in case of an
128 GB SSD with 8 kB pages. We will, in fact, choose the diversifier to be much
shorter, so that a practical implementation is possible that minimally modifies
the SSD firmware. This diversifier cannot be selected at random, as it would
be too short to avoid repetitions for a particular sector. But it can also not be
a counter, as all diversifier values should be used roughly an equal number of
times over all sectors to spread the writes over the entire disk layout.
In our solution, we want to avoid that the SSD needs to send data back to
the host for decryption and re-encryption under a different diversifier, as this
would affect the SSD performance quite drastically. Therefore, wear leveling and
garbage collection operations may not change the diversifier. A straightforward
solution is then to make the diversifier correspond to the LUN (or a set of LUNs),
which is what we will implement and benchmark in the following section.
7 These blocks should not be confused with the blocks of the block cipher, nor with
the “block” (actually “sector”) in the term Logical Block Address (LBA).
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Table 4. EagleTree Benchmarks for various diversifier sizes.
diversifier size (bits)
0 1 2 3
read latency (µs) 28.292 28.862 31.619 40.640
write latency (µs) 32.009 32.070 32.470 34.560
read throughput (IOPS) 20860 20493 19050 15634
write throughput (IOPS) 31240 31181 30797 28935
garbage collector reads 1284043 1295530 1356043 1489623
garbage collectorwrites 1284043 1295530 1356041 1489622
erasures 18569 18765 19661 21634
The OS can freely select the diversifier values, however they may not be re-
peated for any particular sector, and all diversifier values should be used roughly
the same number of times. In Appendix A, we give a concrete example of an
application where the OS implements such diversifier. More specifically, we show
how the OS can ensure randomness and uniqueness even for very short diversifier
values.
EagleTree Benchmarks. In order to confirm that the concept of a diversifier
is not just feasible but also efficient to implement, we implemented this feature in
the EagleTree SSD simulator [9] and performed various benchmarks. An overview
of the source code modifications can be found in Appendix C.
The device that is simulated consists of eight packages, each containing four
dies of 256 blocks. Each block consists of 128 pages of 4096 bytes. EagleTree
currently does not support multiple planes per die. The page read, page write,
bus ctrl, bus data and block erase delays are 5, 20, 1, 10 and 60 µs respectively.
We assume that any latencies incurred by the OS (including sector encryption
and decryption) are negligible with respect to these numbers. The SSD has an
overprovisioning factor of 0.7.
We simulate an SSD configured with DFTL and the greedy garbage collection
policy. The base benchmarks use a simple block scheduler that assigns the next
write to whichever package is free. We then compare this performance to various
choices of the diversifier value, which determines the package for every write.
The workload used in our benchmarks, is the same as the example in Ea-
gleTree’s demo.cpp file: first a large write is made to the entire logical address
space. This write is performed in random order, but without writing to the same
address twice. Once this large write is finished, two threads are started up: one
performs random reads, and the other performs random writes in the address
space. After three million I/O operations, the simulation is stopped.
The benchmark results are shown in Table 4. They suggest that not to choose
the number of diversifier values to be equal to the number of packages, as the im-
pact on performance is quite significant. Compared to the benchmarks without
diversifier, the throughput of the reads and writes drop by 25% and 7% respec-
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tively. The average latency increases by 44% for reads, and 8% for writes. In this
setup, the reads and writes of each garbage collection operation are restricted to
one package, and this affects performance quite significantly. Reads suffer more
than writes; this is mainly because there is no significant drop in performance
for the initial write operations to fill up the SSD.
To avoid the large impact on performance, we must therefore choose the
number of diversifier values to be smaller than the number of packages. When
the diversifier is two bits, our simulations show an increase of the average latency
of 12% for reads and 1% for writes, and a reduction of throughput of 9% for reads
and 1% for writes. The total throughput reduction (reads and writes combined)
is at most 4%. For a diversifier of one bit, latency and throughput are affected
by less than 2%. We also looked into the number of garbage collection and the
number of erasures. They worsen by less than 6% for a diversifier of two bits,
but by 16% for a diversifier of three bits.
7 Conclusion
We presented a theoretical framework for disk encryption and we analyzed
several existing constructions against chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext
attacks, under different notions of the ideal-world encryption oracle: up-to-
repetition, up-to-prefix, or up-to-block.
Using this model, we recalled that IGE-essiv does not have chosen-ciphertext-
security under any of the notions that we consider, which shows that the AREA
construction proposed by Fruhwirth [12] is insecure. Nevertheless, we proved
that IGE-essiv and even CBC-essiv can provide security under chosen-plaintext
attacks, under the assumption that the first block of a plaintext is never repeated
for the same sector number.
We also revisited FDE from an engineering perspective, and showed how to
modify the firmware of a solid-state drive to associate a short “diversifier” to
every sector-plaintext pair (s,m). This diversifier makes it possible to encrypt
the same plaintext into different ciphertexts, something that was previously im-
possible without additional storage.
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A Case Studies
We now present three case studies for FDE. They apply the theoretical frame-
work developed in this paper, in order to obtain novel practical solutions that
advance the state of the art. For each of the case studies, we explain the advan-
tages of our solutions over existing techniques. The examples are rather concrete
for the sake of clarity, but the practical relevance of our results is not limited to
these particular examples.
A.1 On-Line Ciphers for FDE
Case Description. We consider an FDE application for which both encryption
and decryption must be on-line. Off-line modes of operation cannot be imple-
mented due to a practical restriction: the encryption and decryption must be
performed by a hardware security module (HSM) that does not have enough
memory to store an entire sector. With this consideration in mind, what FDE
security notions can be achieved by this application?
Solution. As encryption and decryption must be on-line, we know that two
plaintexts with a common prefix will result in ciphertexts that have a common
prefix as well. In the “up-to-prefix” setting, Table 1 explains that the commonly-
used CBC (e.g. in Microsoft’s BitLocker [11]) nor its “improved” IGE variant
(see e.g. Fruhwirth [12]) provide chosen-plaintext or chosen-ciphertext security.
However, these security properties can be achieved by TC2 and TC3.
Advantages. We are unaware of any applications of TC2 and TC3 in FDE.
However, when encryption and decryption must be on-line, these constructions
provide up-to-prefix chosen-ciphertext security in a setting where the commonly-
used CBC and the often-proposed IGE are insecure.
A.2 FDE-Aware Database Applications
Case Description. After intensive benchmarking, a database application was
found to achieve an insufficiently high throughput when encryption is enabled.
Without encryption, the performance of the database application is within ac-
ceptable limits. To avoid the security risks of storing data in plain, a decision
was made to use a hardware-based FDE based on CBC-essiv.
Database applications are often already aware of the sector size to align read
and write operations to sector boundaries,8 and these operations already contain
some wastage.9 This is also the case for the application that we consider, which
additionally also knows whether FDE is enabled for a particular disk volume. For
the given application, at least eight bytes of padding are added to the end of every
8
https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/psssql/2011/01/13/sql-server-new-drives-use-4k-sector-size/
9
https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E18283_01/server.112/e17120/onlineredo002.htm
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record in order to ensure sector alignment. Is it possible for this application to
achieve indistinguishability under chosen plaintexts, which implies that identical
sector plaintexts will result in distinct ciphertexts?
Solution. CBC-essiv is a common solution for FDE, but unfortunately Table 1
explains that it does not achieve any of the IND-CPA notions that are defined in
this paper. However, Table 2 shows that IND-CPA can be achieved for CBC-essiv
if the first plaintext block for every sector is unique. The application can decide to
reduce the padding at the end of every record by eight bytes, and instead prepend
an eight-byte time stamp. Assuming that this time stamp will not repeat, the
first plaintext block of every sector is unique, and indistinguishability under
chosen plaintext attacks holds. Of course, the application should detect whether
FDE using CBC-essiv is enabled for a particular disk, and return an error if this
is not the case.
Advantages. To the best of our knowledge, existing solutions would encrypt at
the application level, at the disk level using FDE, or would use a combination of
both. The FDE is unaware of the application, as it performs encryption at the
sector level. But what if the application is aware of the FDE? If that is the case,
we explain how the application can generate plaintexts of a particular structure
in order to obtain a stronger notion of FDE security, but without performing
any encryption at the application level.
A.3 On-the-Fly Firmware Updates
Case Description. A medical monitoring system continuously measures the
patient’s vital signs. The device has an Internet connection, which it uses to
transmit its measurements, as well as to install security-critical on-the-fly firmware
updates. The firmware is stored in off-chip Flash memory. Hackers could easily
read out previous versions of the firmware, as they were stored without encryp-
tion.
To prevent such attacks, the company has decided to use FDE because there
is no space to store additional data such as IVs, nonces or tags. However, the
company identifies a problem with FDE: if hackers know which sectors in the
Flash memory are modified by a security update, they can compare these sectors
with older firmware. These hackers can then sniff around in the same part of the
code to quickly rediscover the security vulnerability, and possibly exploit it before
the devices in the field are updated. How can this problem be avoided?
Solution. It seems that the company wants to represent sectors with identical
plaintexts by different ciphertexts, in order to hide which sectors are affected by a
firmware update. Classical FDE does not allow this, as there is no space to store
additional data such as an IV or nonce. However, Flash-based storage allows us
to achieve security against chosen plaintexts, by modifying the Flash controller
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to introduce a diversifier. Depending on the security requirements against chosen
ciphertexts, Table 3 proposes various solutions.
Initially, the diversifier will be the most significant d bits of the hash of
the sector number, where d is the size of the diversifier in bits. Every firmware
update will have a version number, which will be XORed to the diversifier of
every sector. Clearly, the number of firmware updates must be less than the
number of diversifier values. Under this restriction, all diversifiers will be unique
for a particular sector.
Note that the diversifier cannot be a counter, as this would result in a sig-
nificant degradation of performance. But it can also not be chosen at random,
as this will likely result in collisions due to the small size of the diversifier.
Advantages. An alternative solution may be to randomize all the instructions
for every firmware update, but this technique is very error-prone and it will be
difficult (if not impossible) to ensure that the device remains in a consistent
state, in particular if power is lost during an on-the-fly firmware update. Our
solution avoids this: for sectors that are unaffected by the update, the ciphertext
changes but the plaintext remains the same.
Changing the FDE key is not an option for an on-the-fly update: while the
device is being updated, there is no non-volatile memory available to store the
mapping between encryption keys and sector numbers. However, changing the
FDE key is possible during scheduled maintenance, when updates do not need to
be performed on the fly. The firmware update counter can then be reset. There-
fore, as long as the number of on-the-fly updates before scheduled maintenance
is less than d, the small size of the diversifier does not present a problem.
B Security Game Definitions
Indistinguishability up-to-block. The first security game (described in Fig. 2)
defines indistinguishability up-to-block. This notion formalizes that each cipher-
text block depends deterministically on the plaintext block, the sector number
s and the block position in the plaintext, but behaves as “randomly as possible”
subject to this constraint. The game uses independent random permutations
Π(s,i) : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n for each sector number s and each block position
i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}. We specifically introduce this setting to describe the security goal
of XTS, see Rogaway [25] for a formal definition (using a filter function) of what
is known to leak by the XTS mode.
Indistinguishability up-to-prefix. The second security game (described in
Fig. 3) defines indistinguishability up-to-prefix. This notion formalizes that for
i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, the i-th ciphertext block depends deterministically on the sector
number s and all previous plaintext blocks at position j for j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, but
again behave as “randomly as possible” subject to this constraint. The game
uses independent random permutations Πim : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}n for each sector
number s and each plaintext prefix m ∈ {0, 1}t·n for t ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}.
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procedure Initialize: b
$
← {0, 1}; K
$
← {0, 1}k
procedure Encrypt (s,m):
if b = 0 then ⊲ Real world
c ← Enc(K, s,m)
else ⊲ Random world
for i from 1 to ℓ do
if Π(s,i)(mi) = undefined then
Π(s,i)(mi)
$
← Rng(Π(s,i))
end if
ci ← Π(s,i)(mi)
end for
c ← c1|| . . . ||cℓ
end if
return c
procedure Decrypt (s, c):
if b = 0 then ⊲ Real world
m ← Dec(K, s, c)
else ⊲ Random world
for i from 1 to ℓ do
if (Π(s,i))−1(ci) = undefined then
(Π(s,i))−1(ci)
$
← Dom(Π(s,i))
end if
mi ← (Π(s,i))−1(ci)
end for
m ← m1||..||mk
end if
return m
procedure Finalize (b′): return (b = b′)
Fig. 2. Security game “up-to-block”: IND-CPA-block
Algorithm 1 findLCP(ds,t, ’d’) for d ∈ {m, c}
p ← 0 ; pref ← 0 ; index ← 0
for j from 1 to t− 1 do
for i from 1 to ℓ do
while dis,j = d
i
s,t do p ← i
end while
end for
if p > pref then
pref ← p; index ← j
end if
end for
return (index, pref)
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This notion corresponds to the security notion described in [1, 2] for on-line
ciphers.
Indistinguishability up-to-repetition. The third security game (described in
Fig. 4) defines indistinguishability up-to-repetition. This notion formalizes that
each ciphertext block depends deterministically on the plaintext block and the
sector number s, but behaves as “randomly as possible” subject to this con-
straint. The game uses independent random permutationsΠs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
for each sector number s. It is the best achievable notion for (length-preserving)
deterministic encryption [3].
C EagleTree Modifications
We based ourselves on the latest commit of EagleTree on GitHub10 of February
23, 2016, to which we made three small modifications. In particular:
– We added an additional diversifier data member to the Event class, which
is set to a random value every time the operation system generates a write
operation in generate io().
– The get free block pointer with shortest IO queue() function in the
Block manager parent class now has a diversifier argument added to it.
It restricts I/O operations to the package that is specified by the value of
diversifier.
– In the block manager Block manager parallel, the choose best address()
and choose any address() functions were redefined. For write operations
that are issued either by the operating system or by the garbage collector,
the package will be restricted to the value of the diversifier. This value
is passed on when get free block pointer with shortest IO queue() is
called within this function. No modifications are made for reads and writes
to sectors that are not visible to the OS, such as for example the mapping
information I/O generated by the FTL.
D Security Proofs
CBC-essiv. The following theorem shows that CBC-essiv achieves IND-CPA-
ufb security notion.
Theorem 3 (The IND-CPA-ufb Security of CBC-essiv)
Let E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a block cipher. Let A be an IND-CPA-ufb
adversary against the FDE scheme obtained from the CBC-essiv mode on E such
that A runs in time t and makes at most q queries to the Encrypt procedure.
There exists an adversary B (attacking the PRF security of E) such that:
Advind−cpa−ufbcbc−essiv (A) ≤ 8 ·Adv
prf
E (B) +
q2(ℓ+ 1)2
2n−1
10
https://github.com/ClydeProjects/EagleTree
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procedure Initialize: b
$
← {0, 1}; K
$
← {0, 1}k; t ← 0
procedure Encrypt (s,m):
t ← t+ 1
if b = 0 then ⊲ Real world
c ← Enc(K, s,m)
else ⊲ Random world
ms,t ← m
(index, p) ← findLCP(ms,t, ’m’)
for i from 1 to p do
cis,t ← c
i
s,index
end for
for i from p+ 1 to k do
Πs
m1..mi−1
(mis,t)
$
← Rng(Πs
m1..mi−1
)
cis,t ← Π
s
m1m2...mi−1
(mis,t)
end for
end if
return cs,t
procedure Decrypt (s, c):
t ← t+ 1
if b = 0 then ⊲ Real world
m ← Dec(K, s, c)
else ⊲ Random world
(index, p) ← findLCP(cs,t, ’c’)
for i from 1 to p do
mis,t ← m
i
s,index
end for
for i from p+ 1 to k do
(Πs
m1..mi−1
)−1(cis,t)
$
← Dom(Πs
m1..mi−1
)
mis,t
$
← (Πsm1m2...mi−1)
−1(cis,t)
end for
end if
return ms,t
procedure Finalize (b′): return (b = b′)
Fig. 3. Security Game “up-to-prefix”: IND-CPA-prefix
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procedure Initialize: b
$
← {0, 1}; K
$
← {0, 1}k
procedure Encrypt (s,m):
if b = 0 then ⊲ Real world
c ← Enc(K, s,m)
else ⊲ Random world
if Πs(m) = undefined then
Πs(m)
$
← Rng(Πs)
end if
c ← Πs(m)
end if
return c
procedure Decrypt (s, c):
if b = 0 then ⊲ Real world
m ← Dec(K, s, c)
else ⊲ Random world
if (Πs)−1(c) = undefined then
(Πs)−1(c)
$
← Dom(Πs)
end if
m ← Πs(c)
end if
return m
procedure Finalize (b′): return (b = b′)
Fig. 4. Security Game “up-to-repetition”: IND-CPA-repetition
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where B runs in time at most t′ = t + O(q + nq(ℓ + 1)) and makes at most
q′ = q(ℓ+ 1) queries to its oracle.
Proof. Let G0 be the real-or-random security game as defined in Fig. 3. In the
following, we consider a sequence of modified games G1, . . . , G4. We wish to
upper bound the advantage of an adversary A which by definition is
Advind−cpa−ufbcbc−essiv (A) = 2 · Pr[G
A
0 ⇒ true]− 1.
– Game G1: Game G1 is identical to game G0 except that instead of the keyed
block cipher encryption E(K ′, ·) with a key K ′ randomly chosen in the FDE
scheme obtained from the CBC-essiv, we use a random function F ′ instead.
As in the previous security notions, the function F is generated via the lazy
sampling method. The game G1 is given in details in Fig. 5.
We consider an adversary B′ attacking the PRF security of E which runs A
and simulates these two games by replacing the evaluation of E or F ′ by its
own oracle (so that if B′ is in the real world, A is in the game G0 but if B
′
is in the random world, A is in the game G1). If A makes q queries to the
Encrypt procedure than B′ makes q′ = q(ℓ + 1) queries to its own oracle
and we have:
Pr[GA0 ⇒ 1]− Pr[G
A
1 ⇒ 1] ≤ Adv
prf
E (B
′).
Game G1
procedure Encrypt (s,m)
if b = 0 then
c0
$
← {0, 1}n
if s ∈ Dom(F ′) then
c0 ← F ′(s)
else
F ′(s) ← c0
end if
for i from 1 to ℓ do
X ← ci−1 ⊕mi
ci ← E(K,X)
end for
c ← c1||c2||..||cℓ
else
c
$
← {0, 1}ℓn
end if
return c
Fig. 5. Game G1 CBC-essiv IND-CPA-ufb
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– Game G2: Game G2 is identical to game G1 except that instead of the keyed
block cipher encryption E(K, ·) with a key K randomly chosen in the FDE
scheme obtained from the CBC-essiv, we use a random function F instead.
As in the previous security notions, the function F is generated via the lazy
sampling method. The game G2 is given in details in Fig. 5.
Again we consider an adversary B′′ attacking the PRF security of E which
runs A and simulates these two games by replacing the evaluation of E or
F by its own oracle (so that if B′′ is in the real world, A is in the game G0
but if B′′ is in the random world, A is in the game G1). If A makes q queries
to the Encrypt procedure than B′′ makes q′ = q(ℓ + 1) queries to its own
oracle and we have:
Pr[GA1 ⇒ 1]− Pr[G
A
2 ⇒ 1] ≤ Adv
prf
E (B
′′).
Game G1
procedure Encrypt (s,m)
if b = 0 then
c0
$
← {0, 1}n
if s ∈ Dom(F ′) then
c0 ← F ′(s)
else
F ′(s) ← c0
end if
for i from 1 to ℓ do
ci
$
← {0, 1}n
X ← ci−1 ⊕mi
if X ∈ Dom(F) then
ci ← F(X)
end if
F(X) ← ci
end for
c ← c1||c2||..||cℓ
else
c
$
← {0, 1}ℓn
end if
return c
Fig. 6. Game G2 CBC-essiv IND-CPA-ufb
– Game G3: Game G3 (see Fig. 7) is identical to game G1 except that we add
Boolean flags in the pseudo-code for the remainder of the proof (see Fig. 7).
We have
Pr[GA2 ⇒ 1] = Pr[G
A
3 ⇒ 1].
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– Game G4: The games G3 and G4 (see Fig. 7) are identical except if the
Boolean flag bad2 is set to true. We thus have
Pr[GA3 ⇒ 1]− Pr[G
A
4 ⇒ 1] ≤ Pr[G
A
3 sets bad2].
Game G3 Game G4 Game G5
procedure Encrypt (s,m)
if b = 0 then
c0
$
← {0, 1}n
if s ∈ Dom(F ′) then
c0 ← F ′(s)
else
if c0 ∈ Rng(F ′) then bad1 ← true
end if
F ′(s) ← c0
end if
for i from 1 to ℓ do
X ← ci−1 ⊕mi
X
$
← {0, 1}n
ci
$
← {0, 1}n
if X ∈ Dom(F) then
ci ← F(X)
bad2 ← true
end if
F(X) ← ci
end for
c ← c1||c2||..||cℓ
else
c
$
← {0, 1}ℓn
end if
return c
Fig. 7. Games G3, G4 and G5 CBC-essiv IND-CPA-ufb. The framed statement is in-
cluded in game G3 only. The statement overlined in gray is included in game G5 only.
– Game G5: In game G5 (see Fig. 7), the generated ciphertexts in the Encrypt
procedure are independent of the bit b and we have Pr[GA4 ⇒ 1] = 1/2.
We first evaluate Pr[GA5 sets bad1]. For the i-th request to the Encrypt proce-
dure, the probability to have a collision for the output of the F ′ is at most (i−1)2n
then for all the q queries:
Pr[GA5 sets bad1] ≤
q�
i=1
(i − 1)
2n
=
q(q − 1)
2n+1
.
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If the Boolean flag bad1 is not set to true, then in the security game, the adversary
A never queried the Encrypt procedure with two different sector numbers s and
s′ such that F(s) = F(s′). In particular, for each query the value c0 is random
and not revealed to A and by the unique-first-block assumption, it is never used
twice with the same plaintext block m1. We thus have:
Pr[GA4 sets bad2 but not bad1]
= Pr[GA5 sets bad2 but not bad1]
Finally, in game G5, we have
Pr[GA5 sets bad2] ≤
(ℓ+1)q−1�
i=1
i
2n
≤
q2(ℓ+ 1)2
2n+1
.
Summing up, we obtain that Advind−cpa−ufbcbc−essiv (A) is upper-bounded by
2 ·AdvprfE (B
′) + 2 ·AdvprfE (B
′′) +
q2(ℓ+ 1)2
2n
+
q(q − 1)
2n
.
Considering an adversary B attacking the PRF security of E which simply runs
B′ with probability 1/2 and B′′ with probability 1/2, we have
AdvprfE (B) ≥
1
2
AdvprfE (B
′) and AdvprfE (B) ≥
1
2
AdvprfE (B
′′)
and we obtain the claimed bound.
IGE-essiv. The following theorem shows that IGE-essiv achieves IND-CPA-
ufb security notion.
Theorem 4 [IND-CPA-ufb Security of IGE-essiv]
Let E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a block cipher. Let A be an IND-CPA-ufb
adversary against the FDE scheme obtained from the IGE-essiv mode on E such
that A runs in time t and makes at most q queries to the Encrypt procedure.
There exists an adversary B (attacking the PRF security of E) such that:
Advind−cpa−ufbige−essiv (A) ≤ 2 ·Adv
prf
E (B) +
q2(ℓ+ 1)2
2n−1
where B runs in time at most t′ = t + O(q + nq(ℓ + 1)) and makes at most
q′ = q(ℓ+ 1) queries to its oracle.
Proof. This proof is similar to CBC-essiv proof. Let G0 be the real-or-random
security game as defined in Figure 3. In the following, we consider a sequences
of modified games G1, . . . , G5. We wish to upper bound the advantage of an
adversary A which by definition is
Advind−cpa−ufbige−essiv (A) = 2 · Pr[G
A
0 ⇒ true]− 1.
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Game G1
procedure Encrypt (s,m)
if b = 0 then
m0 ← 0n
c0
$
← {0, 1}n
if s ∈ Dom(F) then
c0 ← F(s)
else
F(s) ← c0
end if
for i from 1 to ℓ do
Y
$
← {0, 1}n
X ← ci−1 ⊕mi
if X ∈ Dom(F) then
Y ← F(X)
end if
F(X) ← Y
ci ← Y ⊕mi−1
end for
c ← c1||c2||..||cℓ
else
c
$
← {0, 1}ℓn
end if
return c
Fig. 8. Game G1 IGE-essiv IND-CPA-ufb
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Game G3 Game G4 Game G5
procedure Encrypt (s,m)
if b = 0 then
m0 ← 0n
c0
$
← {0, 1}n
if s ∈ Dom(F ′) then
c0 ← F ′(s)
else
if c0 ∈ Rng(F ′) then bad1 ← true
end if
F ′(s) ← c0
end if
for i from 1 to ℓ do
X ← ci−1 ⊕mi
X
$
← {0, 1}n
Y
$
← {0, 1}n
if X ∈ Dom(F) then
Y ← F(X)
bad2 ← true
end if
F(X) ← Y
ci ← Y ⊕mi−1
ci
$
← {0, 1}n
end for
c ← c1||c2||..||cℓ
else
c
$
← {0, 1}ℓn
end if
return c
Fig. 9. Games G3, G4, G5 IGE-essiv IND-CPA-ufb. The statement in box is omitted in
games G4 and G5. The statement overlined in gray is included in Game G5 only.
– G0 - G4: The only point that changes between CBC-essiv games G0 to G4 is
that the ciphertext block is not the output of the PRF Π but the output
XORed with the previous plaintext block.
– G5: We came back to the CBC-essiv’s G5. In G4 the ciphertext blocks c
i
are the result of a XOR between the previous plaintext block and the PRF
F output that is why G5 the ciphertext blocks c
i are randomly chosen in
{0, 1}n.
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